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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit's criminal procedure decisions over the past survey
period were especially significant for both sides of the criminal bar. The
court confronted the affect the availability of a telephone warrant can have
in precluding a warrantless search, analyzed the affect the use of firearms has
in characterizing a police detention, adopted the "inevitable discovery ex-
ception" to the exclusionary rule, and once again addressed the problems
inherent in police use of a drug courier profile. The court also explored the
sixth amendment implications of judicially foreshortened trial preparation
time, and resolved several issues relating to exhaustion of claims prior to
filing a federal habeas corpus petition. Additional issues addressed by the
court are illuminated by the section headings.
I. UNITED STATES V. MASSEY: POST-ARREST SILENCE AND THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE
Massey and five others made a round trip from Oklahoma to Missouri
to harvest wild marijuana.' Massey was arrested while returning to
Oklahoma and was eventually convicted of possessing marijuana with intent
to distribute and conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute.
2
At trial, Massey testified that he had been a deputy sheriff and that he
was acting in an undercover capacity when he made the trip to Missouri.
3
Massey told the jury that the undercover operation had been discussed in
the presence of third parties prior to the trip.4 This testimony was corrobo-
rated by two of those parties. 5 Massey was then cross-examined at length
about his post-arrest failure to inform law enforcement authorities that he
had been working in an undercover capacity.6 During closing argument, the
prosecutor encouraged the jury to conclude that Massey's exculpatory story
was untrue because it had not been mentioned to the appropriate authorities
following the arrest.
7
Massey argued on appeal that reversible error occurred when the prose-
cutor was permitted to elicit evidence of Massey's post-arrest silence and
comment upon that silence in an effort to impeach Massey's defense. The
Tenth Circuit reversed Massey's conviction and remanded for further pro-
ceedings.8 In an opinion by Judge Seymour, the court recognized that the
i. United States v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1351 (10th Cir. 1982).
2. Id. Massey's convictions were pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982) (possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute) and 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982) (conspiracy to possess mari-
juana with intent to distribute).





8. Id. at 1356.
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use of a defendant's post-arrest silence to impeach an exculpatory story vio-
lates due process if the silence follows the giving of Miranda warnings. 9 This
is because the Miranda warnings contain an implicit assurance that the de-
fendant will not be penalized for his silence.' 0 Impeachment use of a de-
fendant's silence before the giving of Miranda warnings, however, is
permissible because in that context the defendant has not relied upon im-
plicit police assurances that his silence will not be used against him.1 The
record in United States v. Massey 12 failed to indicate when, if at all, Massey
was given his Miranda warnings.13 The case was therefore remanded to the
trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the timing of Massey's Miranda
warnings. 14
The Tenth Circuit's remand contained instructions for disposition of
Massey following the evidentiary hearing. If the trial court found that Mas-
sey's post-arrest silence followed his receipt of Miranda warnings, the defend-
ant would be entitled to a new trial because a review of the entire record
convinced the Tenth Circuit that the constitutional error in Masse; was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' 5 The court noted that Massey was
questioned not only about his silence at the time of his arrest, but also about
his silence at subsequent interrogations, at his initial appearance, at the mag-
istrate's office, at the bond hearing, and at the arraignment. 16 Given the
relentlessness of the prosecutor's attack on the "heart" of Massey's defense,
the court ruled that if the trial court should find Massey's silence followed
Miranda warnings, a new trial was mandated.1
7
II. UNITED STATES V CUARON: TELEPHONE WARRANTS AND EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES
United States v. Cuaron I required the Tenth Circuit to consider, for the
first time, whether the circumstances surrounding an arrest were sufficiently
9. Id at 1353. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) requires that persons subjected to
custodial interrogations be informed of their right to remain silent, the likelihood that incrimi-
nating statements will be used by the prosecution, and the right to counsel even if indigent. Id
at 467-68.
10. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Doyle is the dispositive Supreme Court decision on
the use of post-arrest silence. In Doyle, the Court held that because the Mranda warnings im-
plied that a defendant would not be penalized for remaining silent, due process was violated by
commenting on silence which had been encouraged by giving the warnings. Id at 618-19 (cit-
ing United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1975)).
11. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982), cted 6n United States v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348,
1353 (10th Cir. 1982).
12. 687 F.2d 1348 (10th Cir. 1982).
13. Id at 1353.
14. Id
15. Id. at 1354. The court stated that the following factors were significant in determining
the degree of constitutional error caused by prosecutorial use of post-arrest, post-Miranda warn-
ing silence: 1) the nature of the prosecution's use of the silence; 2) whether the prosecution or
defendant initiated the inquiry into the silence; 3) the quantum of other inculpatory evidence;
4) the degree of prosecutorial emphasis on the silence; and 5) the trial judge's opportunity to
grant a mistrial or issue a curative instruction. Id See also Williams v. Zadradnick, 632 F.2d
353 (4th Cir. 1980), quoted in Massey, 687 F.2d at 1353.
16. 687 F.2d at 1354.
17. Id.
18. 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983).
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exigent to justify police failure to obtain even a telephone warrant. 19 The
Tenth Circuit, over a dissent by Judge Kelly, 20 upheld the trial court's rul-
ing that the exigent circumstances in Cuaron justified a warrantless entry into
a private home.
2 1
Cuaron arose after Jon and William Neet sold four ounces of cocaine to
undercover Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents in Boulder, Colo-
rado.2 2 The agents negotiated for the purchase of two additional pounds of
the drug, which the Neets agreed to procure from their supplier.2 3 Jon was
followed to the home of Frank Cuaron, which was immediately placed under
surveillance. 24 When John returned to the hotel and delivered additional
cocaine to the undercover agents, he and his brother were promptly arrested,
and the agents began efforts to obtain a state court warrant to search
Cuaron's home. 25 Less than an hour after the Neets were arrested, the
agents decided to "secure" Cuaron's home without a warrant. 26 Entering
the home, the agents saw one occupant apparently signal another person in
an upstairs room; an agent rushed up the stairs and caught Cuaron in the
act of flushing cocaine down the toilet. 27 Cocaine lying in plain view was
also seized.
28
Cuaron was later convicted on four related counts29 and appealed on
19. Id. at 586. Telephone warrants were authorized by Congress to encourage police of-
ficers to obtain warrants when circumstances existed which might induce an officer to conduct a
warrantless search. Id. at 588-89 (citing United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1146 (D.C.
Cir. 1976); S. REP. No. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprintedtn 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 527, 534. The provision for telephone warrants is found in FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2),
which provides in pertinent part:
Warrant upon Oral Testimony
(A) General Rule. If the circumstances make it reasonable to dispense with a
written affidavit, a Federal magistrate may issue a warrant based upon sworn oral
testimony communicated by telephone or other appropriate means.
(B) Application. The person who is requesting the warrant shall prepare a doc-
ument to be known as a duplicate original warrant and shall read such duplicate
original warrant, verbatim, to the Federal magistrate. The Federal magistrate shall
enter, verbatim, what is so read to such magistrate on a document to be known as the
original warrant. The Federal magistrate may direct that the warrant be modified.
(C) Issuance. If the Federal magistrate is satisfied that the circumstances are
such as to make it reasonable to dispense with a written affidavit and that grounds for
the application exist so that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, the
Federal magistrate shall order the issuance of a warrant by directing the person re-
questing the warrant to sign the Federal magistrate's name on the duplicate original
warrant. The Federal magistrate shall immediately sign the original warrant and
enter on the face of the original warrant the exact time when the warrant was ordered
to be issued. The finding of probable cause for a warrant upon oral testimony may be
based on the same kind of evidence as is sufficient for a warrant upon affidavit.
20. Honorable Patrick F. Kelly, District Judge, United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Kansas. sitting by designation.
21. United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 591 (10th Cir. 1983).







29. Cuaron was convicted of two counts of distributing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (1982) and 21 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); one count of conspiring to distribute in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1982); and of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982). 700 F.2d at 584.
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the ground, inter alia, that the trial court had wrongfully failed to suppress
evidence discovered through the warrantless search of his home.30 Cuaron
did not argue that exigent circumstances could never justify a warrantless
search; rather, he argued that the DEA agents had no objective basis to be-
lieve that criminal evidence was about to to be destroyed, thereby preclud-
ing a finding of exigent circumstances in his case. 3 1 Cuaron further argued
that in any event there was sufficient time to obtain a federal search warrant
by telephone pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c),32 and
that the agents' violation of the fourth amendment's3 3 prohibition against
warrantless searches therefore could not have been justified by exigent
circumstances.
34
The Tenth Circuit opinion, by Judge Seymour, noted that warrantless
seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable, 35 and that the prose-
cution has the burden of establishing exigent circumstances.3 6 The court
found that the agents' initial entry into Cuaron's home was prompted by
their reasonable belief that criminal evidence and contraband mreht be de-
stroyed or removed before a warrant could have arrived.3 7 The agents knew
that the Neets were to return to effect yet another purchase, but that the
Neets had been arrested and would not be returning to the home within the
time expected. 38 The agents also knew that cocaine is easily transported or
destroyed, 3 9 and that several people had arrived and left Cuaron's residence
following Jon Neet's arrest. 4° Further, the agents had information that
Cuaron was interested in selling his supply of cocaine as quickly as possi-
ble. 4 1 Finally, the agents were "aware" that the supplier was nervous about
operating from his home.42 In the court's view, under these circumstances
the agents could reasonably believe there was insufficient time to obtain
either a conventional warrant or a telephone warrant without losing impor-
30. 700 F.2d at 586.
31. Id The Supreme Court has never expressly sanctioned an independent "destruction of
evidence" exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement, although dicta has sug-
gested approval for warrantless entries in such circumstances. See, e.g., United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976). In Santana, a warrantless entry into the defendant's home was
upheld on the basis that the police were in "hot pursuit" of the defendant. Id at 43. One of the
reasons supporting this holding was a "realistic expectation" that police delay would result in
the destruction of evidence. Id
The dissenting judge in Cuaron pointedly contrasts a "realistic expectation" test for recog-
nizing an exigency with the majority's test for assessing the existence of a purported exigency-
whether the officers have reason to believe that evidence may be lost or destroyed. See 700 F.2d
at 592-93 (Kelly, J., dissenting). The dissent concludes that the latter test is so slippery and
unreliable that its application threatens to swallow the warrant requirement altogether. Id
32. 700 F.2d at 589. See supra note 19.
33. U. S. CONST. amend IV.
34. 700 F.2d at 586.
35. Id at 586 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).
36. 700 F.2d at 580 (citing United States v. Baca, 417 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1969),cert. denied,
404 U.S. 979 (1971)).
37. 700 F.2d at 586-87.
38. Id at 586.
39. See id. at 587.
40. Id. at 586-87.
41. Id. at 586.
42. Id. at 587.
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tant evidence. 43 Thus, the warrantless search was constitutionally permissi-
ble, and the trial court properly admitted the evidence.
44
Judge Seymour rejected the argument that the finding of an exigency
should have been affected by the fact that the agents delayed their warrant-
less search for fifty-five minutes after Neet's arrest.4 5 As long as probable
cause and exigent circumstances existed under the specific facts of Cuaron,
delaying a search did not remove the exigent circumstance, even if the pe-
riod of delay would have allowed the officers to obtain a warrant.
46
After rejecting Cuaron's arguments, the court articulated a prophylactic
standard to be used in all future cases involving exigent circumstances. In
Cuaron, the trial court had failed to consider the availability of a telephone
warrant. 4 1 While the Tenth Circuit found that failure harmless in Cuaron,48
the court did state that trial courts must henceforth consider the availability
of a telephone warrant in determining whether exigent circumstances ex-
isted, unless the "critical nature of the circumstances clearly prevented the
effective use of any warrant procedure."'49 Absent such a clear and compel-
ling exigency, the prosecution must bear the burden of submitting evidence
regarding the availability of a telephone warrant and the time necessary to
obtain one before a warrantless "exigent search" will be upheld.
50
Judge Kelly filed a sharp dissent. In his view, the majority's opinion
will invite "excusable neglect" of established search and seizure procedures,
license future abuse, and unnecessarily plague the courts. 5i Judge Kelly was
bothered by the majority's reliance on one agent's speculative (and self-serv-
ing) testimony regarding the likelihood that evidence would be destroyed or
removed. 52 In his opinion, the court should make an objective comparison
between the likelihood that evidence will be lost or destroyed and the likeli-
hood that a warrant cannot be timely obtained. 53 Judge Kelly preferred
justifing a warrantless "destruction of evidence" exigency only when the con-
stable has something near a "realistic expectation" that evidence will be lost
if time is taken to obtain a warrant. 54 Additionally, Judge Kelly felt that the
majority failed to accurately assess the time required to obtain a telephone
warrant, because its calculation was based on reference to the time normally
required to obtain a warrant from a state judge, rather than by reference to
43. See id. at 587-90. The trial court did not assess the possibility of obtaining a timely
telephone warrant, and apparently the prosecution did not offer any evidence on the question.
Despite this evidentiary vacuum, Judge Seymour managed to conclude that such a warrant
could not possibly be obtained within 30 minutes. Id at 590.
44. Id at 591.
45. Id. at 590.
46. Id.
47. Id at 588.
48. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
49. 700 F.2d at 589 (emphasis in original).
50. Id at 589-90. The court emphasized that Cuaron was a unique situation, and that law
enforcement agencies should not treat the decision as creating a significant breach in the fourth
amendment warrant requirement. See id at 590 & n.6.
51. Id at 591 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
52. Id at 592.
53. Id at 593.
54. Id See also supra note 31.
19841
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the particular time efficiencies created by the availability of a telephone war-
rant. 55 Finally, Judge Kelly opined that because the prosecution offered no
evidence on how long it would have taken to secure a telephone warrant, the
search must fall to the presumption that warrantless searches are unreasona-
ble.56 The telephone warrant was not "an option tendered solely for the
investigating officers' convenience." '57 Rather, even in circumstances like
those of Cuaron a timely attempt to obtain a telephone warrant should have
been mandatory, and conduct to the contrary by well-trained but overzeal-
ous federal agents should not have been excused.
58
III. RESTRICTING THE LIMITS OF A TERRY PATDOWN SEARCH
In United States v. Ward59 the defendant challenged the admission of evi-
dence obtained from a non-arrest patdown search made during a lawful
search of the defendant's home.60 Internal Revenue Service agents had ob-
tained a warrant to search Ward's residence for evidence of illicit bookmak-
ing activities.6 ' Although the agents' affidavits supporting issuance of the
search warrant established probable cause to search Ward's person,62 the
warrant authorized only a search of the residence. 63 The agent executing
the search conducted a cursory patdown search of Ward's person before
searching the house, and then asked Ward if he carried weapons. 64 Ward
was ordered to empty his pockets after revealing he carried a pocketknife;6 5
this action precipitated discovery of betting slips and checks which were ad-
mitted into evidence at trial over Ward's objection. 66 Ward argued that this
evidence should have been suppressed because the scope of the warrant did
not authorize a search of his person. 67 The government argued that the
patdown search constituted a reasonable frisk for weapons under the doc-
55. See 700 F.2d at 594 (Kelly, J., dissenting). Judge Kelly observed that the magistrate
could have been put "on hold," obviating many time constraint exigencies. Id.
56. Id. The Supreme Court has stated that "[it is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment
law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasona-
ble." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
57. 700 F.2d at 594 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 594-95. Neither the dissenting judge nor the majority discuss the agents' role in
creating the exigency. It is not clear from either opinion why the agents chose to arrest the Neets
when they did. Presumably, Jon Neet could have been allowed to return to Cuaron's while the
warrant was being obtained. There is no indication in the opinions that any cocaine or cash
would have been lost had the agents simply continued their surveillance without arresting the
Neets while they waited the "two or three hours" necessary to obtain a state warrant, or the
shorter time required to obtain a federal telephone warrant. In United States v. Rosselli, 506
F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1974), the court held that under circumstances similar to those in Cuaron, an
exigency which followed the agents' conduct could not be utilized as an "easy by-pass of the
constitutional requirement that probable cause should generally be assessed by a neutral and
detached magistrate before the citizen's privacy is invaded." Id at 630.
59. 682 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1982).
60. Id. at 879.
61. Id. at 877.
62. Id at 878 n.2.
63. Id
64. Id at 878.
65. Id
66. Id
67. Id at 879.
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trine of Terry v. Ohio"6 8 and was therefore constitutionally sound regardless of
the scope of the search warrant. 69 The trial court admitted the evidence,
and Ward was convicted of failure to purchase a wagering stamp.70
The Tenth Circuit, with Judge McWilliams dissenting, reversed. In an
opinion by Judge Barrett, the court held that a patdown search is permissi-
ble under Terry only if it is supported by a reasonable belief that the subject
of the search is armed and presently dangerous. 7 ' Because nothing in the
record indicated that the agents believed Ward was armed and presently
dangerous, 72 the evidence discovered during the patdown was illegally seized
and its admission into evidence gave rise to reversible error.73 The court
noted that this fourth amendment violation could have been easily avoided
had the search warrant been drafted to include a search of Ward's person.
74
In dissent, Judge McWilliams emphasized that Ward was the target of
a criminal investigation, and obviously realized this fact when the agents
arrived at his home for the purpose of executing the search warrant. 75 Judge
McWilliams suggested that when a search of a residence must be conducted
in the presence of a home owner who is aware that he is a "target" in a
criminal investigation, the searching officer may reasonably infer that the
homeowner is armed and dangerous and may therefore conduct a limited
patdown search for weapons for their protection. 76 Thus, the search of
Ward was permissible under Terry.
77
Apparently the government did not argue, nor did the court consider,
that the search of Ward's person was valid as an adjunct to the evidence-
gathering function of the search warrant. For instance, in Ybarra v. illinois 78
the defendant, a tavern patron, was illegally searched during the execution
of a search warrant which made no mention of criminal involvement by any
of the patrons. 79 The Court emphasized that none of the circumstances in
that case indicated to the police that Ybarra was connected with the crimi-
nal activity to which the search warrant was addressed, and therefore no
probable cause to search Ybarra existed.830 The circumstances in Ward are
quite different from those in Ybarra. As noted in the dissenting opinion,
Ward was the "target" of the investigation, 8t and, as noted in the majority
opinion, the agent's affidavit was adequate to establish probable cause for
68. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry held that a police officer questioning a citizen as part of a
police investigation may, when he reasonably suspects that person to be "armed and presently
dangerous," frisk that person in an attempt to discover potential weapons of assault. Id at 30.
69. See 682 F.2d at 879.
70. Id. Ward's failure to purchase a wagering stamp violated 18 U.S.C. § 7203 (1982).
71. 682 F.2d at 880. Accord Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85. 92-93 (1979).
72. 682 F.2d at 881.
73. Id
74. Id.
75. Id. at 882 (McWilliams, J., dissenting).
76. Id at 882-83.
77. Id at 882.
78. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
79. Id. at 90.
80. Id. at 90-91. The Court also held that, given Ybarra's behavior, the police could not
subject him to a Terry search. Id at 93-94.
81. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
1984]
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searching both the residence and Ward's person.8 2 Further, many of the
items mentioned in the search warrant could easily have been (and indeed
were) concealed on Ward's person. Under these circumstances, state court
cases since Ybarra almost invariably permit frisks of persons strongly identi-
fied with the premises searched.8 3 Also, it might be argued that Ward is
closer to Mzchigan v. Summers 84 than to Ybarra. Summers held that occupants of
a private premises may be seized and detained while a search warrant for
contraband is executed because of the potential danger attendant to execut-
ing the search warrant when persons connected with those premises are pres-
ent.8 5 Summers' holding was based on a recognition that, after a premises-
specific search warrant issues, detaining the occupants present during the
search constitutes a minimal intrusion on personal liberty while simultane-
ously providing significant personal protection to the searching officers. 86 In
view of Summers' holding and rationale, it would not be implausible to sug-
gest that the incremental liberty intrusion stemming from a frisk during a
Summers detention is similarly outweighed by the increased protection that
frisk provides for those executing the search. Thus, a slight extension of Sum-
mers could have validated the search made in Ward, even though the search
would not have been justified by Tery.
IV. UNITED STATES V MERRIT: SHOW OF FORCE
AND THE TERRY STOP
A. The Case
Denver police officers had received word that Thomas Gerry, a Texas
fugitive wanted for murder, was staying at a home on Sherman Street in
Denver.8 7 Several officers went to this location; Gerry was not there, but the
officers learned that he would be returning later that evening.88 Gerry was
believed to be heavily armed and dangerous, and the officers observed an
impressive array of weapons and ammunition at the Sherman Street
address.
8 9
The officers then set up a stakeout, in anticipation of Gerry's return.9°
Several hours later, while a police cruiser was parked in front of the Sherman
Street home, some officers observed a white pickup truck circle the block,
stop, and switch off its lights.9 1 Nobody exited the truck, and it appeared
that the truck's occupants had assumed a crouching position. 92 Three of-
82. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
83. E.g., People v. Broach, 111 Mich. App. 122, 314 N.W.2d 544 (1982); State v. Brooks, 51
N.C. App. 90, 275 S.E.2d 202 (1981); Lippert v. State, 653 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
84. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
85. Id at 705.
86. Id. at 702-04.
87. United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1265 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
1898 (1983).
88. Id at 1266.
89. Id at 1265-66. The police observed shotguns, handguns, and what appeared to be an
automatic rifle. Id at 1266.





ficers then approached the truck with weapons, including shotguns, pointed
at the truck;93 the occupants were ordered out and told to "freeze." '94 One
or two shotguns were pointed at the suspects at this time, and one shotgun
remained aimed at the suspects throughout the incident. 95 After identifica-
tion revealed that Thomas Gerry was one of the truck's occupants, the truck
was checked for weapons, and a loaded revolver was recovered from under-
neath the driver's seat.96 Merritt, who was also one of the truck's occupants,
was then formally arrested.
97
The trial court suppressed the revolver and several inculpatory state-
ments made by Merritt subsequent to his arrest on the ground that the po-
lice did not, at the time they ordered Merritt and the others from the truck,
have the reasonable suspicion Terry v. Ohio 98 requires in order to justify a
police investigatory stop.99 In an alternative holding, the trial court ruled
that in Merritt's case the police had actually made an arrest without prob-
able cause, even though there may have been justification to make a
"stop.'"100
The government took an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's sup-
pression order. " In a well-reasoned opinion by Judge Anderson, the Tenth
Circuit reversed the suppression order. The court held that, based upon the
totality of the circumstances, the officers who effected the stop had a particu-
larized and objective basis for suspecting that the occupants of the truck
were or had been involved in a criminal activity, and could therefore make a
stop to determine the identities of those in the truck. 
102
B. Use of Hearsay in Suppression Hearings
Judge Anderson observed that the trial court erred at the suppression
hearing when it excluded testimony by two officers concerning critical infor-
mation a third officer had conveyed to them describing the appearance and
movements of the truck and its occupants near the Sherman Street ad-
dress.' 0 3 The Tenth Circuit found that this evidence, if admitted, would
have provided the necessary link to justify a Terry stop. '
0 4
Before reversing the district court's determination that no reasonable
suspicion existed, the Tenth Circuit pointed out that a trial court generally is





98. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The "reasonable suspicion" required for a Ty stop is "[a] particu-
larized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity."
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). The reasonableness of a suspicion is
determined by viewing the "totality of circumstances" confronting the officer. Id.
99. 695 F.2d at 1267.
100. Id It is axiomatic that probable cause is required to make a valid arrest. Probable
cause must be based on the likelihood of an individual's guilt, rather than on reasonable suspi-
cion of possible criminal activity. Seegenerally I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.1 (1978).
101. 695 F.2d at 1267. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1982).
102. 695 F.2d at 1269. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.




not bound by the rules of evidence during a suppression hearing, 1 0 5 and that
-consideration should have been given to the officers' vital testimony, despite
its hearsay character, because these statements were corroborated by other
testimony. 10 6 Moreover, given Gerry's known dangerous character, the of-
ficers who made the hearsay statements had every reason to report their ob-
servations of suspicious behavior as accurately as possible.' 0 7 Because police
officers may rely on hearsay statements "as the basis for reasonable suspicion
to make a stop, they should also be permitted to offer that same hearsay as
testimony to support their reasonable suspicion when a defendant moves to
suppress evidence on the ground that reasonable suspicion did not exist."' 10 8
In reaching its conclusion the Tenth Circuit relied on United States v. Mal-
lock,' 0 9 which approved the use of hearsay evidence in a suppression hearing
concerning third party consent to a premises search. I °
Furthermore, reasonable suspicion could rest upon the collective knowl-
edge of the police officers rather than solely upon the knowledge of the of-
ficer actually making the stop."' In light of the collective knowledge of the
officers involved in the stakeout and stop, the requisite reasonable suspicion
was manifest, and the initial stop was entirely proper.
C. Show of Force During Terry Stop
The Tenth Circuit also rejected the trial court's conclusion that Merritt
was in fact arrested, not merely stopped.' 12 The trial court reasoned that
the encounter immediately escalated into an arrest because the level of force
employed by the police officers during the encounter went beyond that ap-
parently authorized by Tery. 13 The Tenth Circuit observed that the trial
court's analysis somehow assumed that some level of police force during an
otherwise valid Tery stop turns the stop into an arrest requiring probable
cause, regardless of the justification that may exist for the degree of force
used."I4 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that this view of the distinction be-
tween a stop and arrest diverted a court's focus from the central concern in
all fourth amendment cases, which is the reasonableness of the police intru-
sion in light of all the surrounding circumstances.' 15 The relevant inquiry
was not whether the force used was of a quantum requiring characterization
of a stop as an arrest, but rather whether the police used reasonable force. 116
In this case the officers' show of force, including the continuous pointing of
105. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a), I 101(d)(l).
106. 695 F.2d at 1270.
107. Id
108. Id
109. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
110. Id at 175. The Court indicated that hearsay evidence should be admitted at suppres-
sion hearings when the circumstances surrounding the evidence, including corroborating state-
ments by other witnesses, indicate that the hearsay statement is reliable. d. at 175-76.
111. 695 F.2d at 1268 n.9. The "fellow-officer" rule adopted in Merritt had previously been
recognized in cases concerning the existence of probable cause for an arrest. Id
112. 695 F.2d at 1272.
113. Id
114. Id.




weapons, was reasonable given their reasonable suspicion that an armed,
dangerous murderer was present." ' Thus, "the incremental intrusion visited
upon a citizen's personal security by having a gun pointed at him instead of
merely drawn, as was true here, is outweighed by the increased protection
the officers afford themselves by making certain of their safety in face of the
danger presented."' 18
This approach to the investigatory stop arrest distinction is apparently
inconsistent with the approach recently taken by a Supreme Court plurality
in Florida v. Royer.i 19 In that case, the defendant fit a drug courier profile
and was subjected to a valid Terry stop. 120 Following an initial public stop,
however, the defendant was taken to a small room, where he was alone with
two police officers who accused him of carrying narcotics.121 The court held
that because of the intensity of the detention and its purpose (to search the
defendant's luggage) at some point the stop matured or escalated into a
functional, though not a formal, arrest unsupported by probable cause. 
1
22
To the extent the Tenth Circuit's reasoning diminishes the significance of an
intensive, facially coercive detention, it appears inconsistent with Royer.
Merrill is also inconsistent with those circuits which hold that the use of
a drawn, or at the very least pointed, gun converts a stop into an arrest. 123
The court, however, felt that if such clearly self-protective actions as those
taken in arresting Merritt turned every such confrontation into an arrest, an
important public interest in police safety would be sacrificed. 124 Weighed
against the incremental intrusion on a person's liberty stemming from rea-
sonable police use of weapons, the public interest in police safety required
recognizing that the use of drawn and pointed weapons does not in and of
itself transform a Terry stop into an arrest.
125
V. ADOPTION OF THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY EXCEPTION TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In United States v. Romero 126 the Tenth Circuit both recognized that the
scope of a weapons search incident to a Terry stop extends to the detainee's
vehicle1 27 and adopted the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusion-
ary rule. 128 Romero began when a tip made to a Drug Enforcement Agency
agent, supported by corroborative first-hand observations, led Albuquerque
police officers to reasonably suspect that Romero and Ortega were in posses-
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
120. See id at 1326.
121. Id at 1327.
122. Id at 1328-29.
123. See United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Strickler, 490
F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1974).
124. 695 F.2d at 1274.
125. Id
126. 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982).
127. Id at 703.
128. Id. at 704.
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sion of a substantial amount of marijuana. 129 The van in which these two
were riding was stopped and they were ordered out of the vehicle. 130 Officer
Espinosa conducted a patdown search of Romero. 3 ' While Espinosa was
patting down Romero, Officer Ortiz was inspecting the driver's seat area of
the van for weapons and detected a strong odor of marijuana. 132 As he
walked around the van to check for weapons on the passenger side, Ortiz
stated that "It smells like a ton of dope in there."'
' 3 3
Either immediately before or after Officer Ortiz's announcement con-
cerning the marijuana smell1 34 Officer Espinosa felt a "stiff bulge" in Ro-
mero's pocket.' 35 Although not believing the bulge to be a weapon,' 3 6 the
officer reached into the pocket and pulled out a small amount of mari-
juana. 137 Romero and Ortega were arrested; a subsequent search of the van
pursuant to a search warrant resulted in the discovery of several pounds of
marijuana, and Romero was eventually convicted of possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute.'
38
The defendants appealed on the grounds, inter alia, that the officers
twice exceeded their authority under Tery, first by searching the van's inte-
rior for weapons, and second by seizing the marijuana from Romero's pocket
despite Officer Espinosa's belief that the "stiff bulge" was not a weapon.' 3 9
A. Search of Vehicle Permissible Under Terry
In an opinion by Judge Logan, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the convic-
tion.' 40 The court first held that just as an officer may search a car for weap-
ons during a lawful arrest, 14 ' an officer who has lawfully stopped a suspect
whom he reasonably suspects is armed and dangerous may conduct a limited
weapons search of the suspect's car. 142 The court reasoned that such a sus-
pect may have concealed a weapon in a part of a car readily accessible to
him, and might "break away from the police and grab the weapon or, if
allowed to return to the car,. . . may shoot or harm an officer."' 143 In light
of the potential danger in a traffic stop involving a suspect reasonably be-





134. The trial court's findings did not set forth the exact sequence of events. Id at 704.
135. Id at 701.
136. Id
137. Id
138. Id. at 701-02. Romero was found guilty of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982).
139. 692 F.2d at 702.
140. Id at 705.
141. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
142. 692 F.2d at 703.
143. Id. The expansion of Ter7 y recognized in Romero was recently validated by Michigan v.
Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983). Long held that Teny did not limit protective searches to the
suspect's person, and that a weapons search of the passenger compartment of a suspect's vehicle
is permissible under Terr ' when an officer has a reasonable belief in articulable facts suggesting
that the suspect may be dangerous and may have immediate access to weapons in the passenger
compartment. Id. at 3480.
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lieved to be armed, 144 the fact that Romero and Ortega were out of the van
and under the control of other officers before the van was searched did not
render the search an unreasonable intrusion upon a citizen's liberty.
B. Adoption of the "'Inevttable Discoveiy " Exception
The seizure of marijuana from Romero's pants pocket was more trou-
blesome for the court. The court reasoned that if Officer Ortiz's announce-
ment concerning the marijuana odor preceded the seizure of marijuana, the
seizure might be justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest because the
marijuana odor, combined with the anonymous tip and the corroborating
observations which initially justified the stop, gave the officers probable
cause to arrest.' 4 5 Any search thereafter would be proper as a search inci-
dent to a lawful arrest. If Officer Ortiz's announcement followed the seizure,
however, the evidence was illegally seized because Officer Espinosa believed
that the bulge in Romero's pocket was not a weapon, precluding seizure
under Terry. 1
46
Rather than remanding the case to the trial court for a finding as to the
timing of Officer Ortiz's announcement, the Tenth Circuit adopted the "in-
evitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule.' 4 7 Under this excep-
tion, illegally seized evidence is admissible if there is "no doubt" that the
police would have lawfully discovered the evidence at a later time.'14 Ap-
plying this exception to the facts of Romero, the court observed that the van
search was underway as Romero was being patted down, and that Officer
Ortiz's announcement could have occurred no more than a few seconds after
the seizure of marijuana from Romero's pocket. 149 The discovery of the
marijuana odor in the van provided probable cause to arrest, and upon ar-
rest the officers would unquestionably have searched Romero and inevitably
would have discovered the marijuana in the pants pocket. 150
C. Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
The Supreme Court has recognized several discrete situations where the
victim of illegal police conduct cannot use the exclusionary rule to suppress
evidence. One such situation is where the police are able to obtain illegally
seized evidence from an "independent source"; that is, a source whose
knowledge and possession of the evidence were not the result of the illegal
police conduct.' 5 ' Another exception is where the connection between the
illegal police conduct and evidence subsequently acquired is so "attenuated"
144. See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3479 & n.13 (1983).
145. 692 F.2d at 703.
146. Id
147. Id. at 704.
148. Id. The Tenth Circuit noted that although the Supreme Court has not formally
adopted this exception to the exclusionary rule, id. (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406
n.12 (1977)), most circuit courts recognize the inevitable discovery rule. 692 F.2d at 704.
149. 692 F.2d at 704.
150. Id
151. This rule was announced in Silverhorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920). The Court reaffirmed Sitoerthorne in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)
and in Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961).
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as to warrant the conclusion that the evidence was not obtained by exploit-
ing the illegal conduct.
152
The Fifth Circuit has announced a "good faith" exception to the exclu-
sionary rule. In United State v. Mi/liams, 5 3 the court refused to suppress evi-
dence "[dliscovered by officers in the course of actions that are taken in good
faith and in the reasonable though mistaken belief that they are author-
ized."' 154 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the "good faith" exception is con-
sistent with the purpose of the exclusionary rule, which exists to deter willful
or flagrant actions by law enforcement officers, not to deter reasonable, good
faith actions.' 55 Although the Supreme Court has not, to date, adopted such
a broad good faith exception, it appears to be on the verge of doing so in its
next term. 1
5 6
Still another exception to the exclusionary rule, the inevitable discovery
doctrine, has been explicitly recognized by lower federal and state courts,
but has never been expressly sanctioned by the Supreme Court. 15 7 This
exception permits the prosecution to use unlawfully obtained evidence if it
can demonstrate that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered by
lawful means. The prosecution must initially demonstrate that the police
did not use illegal conduct as a means of discovering the evidence.' 58 The
prosecution must then prove that the evidence would have been found with-
out use of illegal conduct and must prove how it would have been found.15
9
All the courts adopting this exception agree that the prosecution has the
burden of proving these elements, but have split as to whether the burden is
a preponderance standard or a clear and convincing standard.
160
Although the Tenth Circuit did not expressly adopt the inevitable dis-
152. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) is the source of this rule. More recent
cases applying this principle are United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) and Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
153. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). See generally
Note, United States v. Williams: The Good Faith Excepton to the Exclusionary Rule, 32 MERCER L.
REV. 1329 (1981).
154. 622 F.2d at 840. Several states have enacted legislation codifying the good faith excep-
tions. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3925 (Supp. 1983-84); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-3-
308 (Supp. 1983).
155. See 622 F.2d at 842.
156. Justice White's concurring opinion in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983) approves
of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 2344 (White, J., concurring). The
Court declined to consider the good faith exception on jurisdictional grounds, 1d. at 2321-25,
but has granted certiorari to review two cases which raise the good faith exception issue. See
United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983); Com-
monwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert. grantedsub nom. Massachu-
setts v. Sheppard, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983).
157. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406 n.12 (1977). The first clear application of
this doctrine was in Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943).
158. See State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 261 (Iowa 1979),cert. denied, 446 U.S. 921 (1980)
(prosecution must show that bad faith actions were not taken in order to hasten discovery of the
evidence). See also United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1048 (5th Cir. 1980) (prosecution
must show that, at time of illegality, police were pursuing the evidence or leads which would
have reasonably led to evidence).
159. See State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 260 (Iowa 1979).
160. Compare United States v. Schipani, 414 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
922 (1970) (preponderance) with Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 927
(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975) (clear and convincing).
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covery exception until Romero, it applied its rationale in United States v. Leo-
nard,16 1 a case decided two years earlier. In Leonard, police officers located a
gun in the glove compartment of Leonard's car during an inventory search
executed after his arrest.' 6 2 Prior to that discovery, however, the arresting
officer had discovered the gun's location through an illegal interrogation of
Leonard.' 6 3 The Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's refusal to suppress
the gun, because it was actually recovered during a valid inventory search
and because its discovery was inevitable regardless of Leonard's state-
ment. 164 The Tenth Circuit, however, based its decision on the independent
source exception to the exclusionary rule' 65 rather than the inevitable dis-
covery exception. 1
66
D. Problems with Romero
The court's decision in Romero, while it unambiguously adopts the inevi-
table discovery exception, offers little or no explanation as to when and how
the exception should be applied by trial courts. The court did not intimate
what the burden of proof should be, nor was any attention paid to the good
faith vel non of the officer who improperly recovers the challenged evidence.
Future cases are necessary to show how the Tenth Circuit will shape the
criteria for use of the exception in district courts, and to demonstrate to what
extent this exception will affect defendants seeking suppression of evidence.
VI. McCRANIE V. UNITED STATES: REASONABLE SUSPICION AND THE
DRUG COURIER PROFILE
In McCranie o. United States ' 67 the Tenth Circuit, in affirming a convic-
tion for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, held that the correla-
tion of a person's behavior with a "drug courier profile," in conjunction with
evidence obtained through investigation based on that correlation, was suffi-
cient to justify seizing that person for investigation of criminal activity. 168
The drug courier profile is a loosely formulated, unwritten checklist of char-
acteristics or traits which narcotics agents believe are common to persons
who traffic in illegal drugs. 169 Among the recurring elements are travel from
drug "source cities" or travel to major drug "use" cities; unusual nervous-
ness; intense scanning of the terminal area; travel with very little luggage;
use of one-way tickets purchased with small bills; travel under an alias; and
placing a telephone call immediately upon arrival.
170
161. 630 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1980).
162. Id at 790.
163. Id The interrogation was illegal because the officer had failed to provide Leonard his
Miranda warnings. Id.
164. Id. at 791.
165. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
166. 630 F.2d at 791.
167. 703 F.2d 1213 (10th Cir.), cer. dented, 104 S. Ct. 484 (1983).
168. 703 F.2d at 1218.
169. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n.1 (1980) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
170. See United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447
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A. Supreme Court Drug Courier Profile Cases
The Court's first decision involving the use of the drug courier profile
was United States v. Mendenhall. 17' Although there was no majority opinion in
Mendenhall, Justice Powell, writing for three members of the Court, stated
that in light of the training of the DEA agents and the matching of Ms.
Mendenhall's conduct with that of the drug courier profile, the DEA agents
had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to
justify a Terry stop. 1 72 Justice Powell emphasized that it was the agents'
experience which validated use of the drug courier profile to single Menden-
hall out for questioning; reliance on the profile alone would probably have
been an insufficient basis to initiate a Terry stop. 173 In a later case, Reid v.
Georgia ,'174 the Court again rejected the sufficiency of the drug courier profile
ex proprio vigore as a basis for establishing the articulable, reasonable suspi-
cion necessary for a Terry stop. Reid involved two travelers who fit the drug
courier profile, but who did not otherwise act in a furtive or unusual man-
ner.' 75 The Court held that the agent could not, as a matter of law, have
reasonably suspected the defendant of criminal activity on the basis of the
observed circumstances' 76 because the circumstances at best supported a
"hunch" that the defendant was transporting narcotics. 177 Then, in Florida
v. Royer,1 78 a plurality of the Court, moving away from Mendenhall and Reid,
apparently disagreed with a state appellate court's conclusion that mere sim-
ilarity with the contents of a drug courier profile cannot establish the articul-
able basis for the reasonable suspicion required to justify a Terry stop. t7 9
B. Previous Tenth Ctrcuil Drug Courier Profile Cases
The Tenth Circuit had decided one drug courier profile case prior to
McCranie. In United States v. MacDonald,'8 0 the court determined that the
articulable suspicion required to justify a Terry investigatory detention was
established when the defendant displayed the following "profile" character-
istics: 1) checking of luggage at an airport which was not the defendant's
final destination; 2) cash payment for a one-way standby ticket; 3) flight
emanating from a drug source city; and 4) the defendant appeared nervous
and did not approach the luggage claim area but directly left the termi-
U.S. 910 (1980). Accord United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n. 1 (1980) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
171. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
172. Id at 565 (Powell, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 565 n.6.
174. 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
175. Id at 441.
176. The only behavior which deviated from that of ordinary travelers was that one peti-
tioner occasionally looked backward at the other. Id.
177. Id
178. 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
179. Compare 103 S. Ct. at 1326 (plurality opinion) (evidence that defendant fit drug courier
profile sufficient to justify detention) with Royer v. State, 389 So.2d 1007, 1019 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (rehearing en banc) (drug courier profile insufficient basis for detention), afd sub
nor. Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
180. 670 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1981).
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nal.181 Although the court did not evaluate the sufficiency of the profile ex
proprio vigore in establishing reasonable suspicion, its approach-which em-
phasized that reasonable suspicion was established by adding the agent's ex-
perience to the traveler's correlation with the drug courier profile' 82 -
closely paralleled that of Justice Powell in United States v. Mendenhall.' 3
C. McCranie v. United States
When DEA agents observed McCranie disembarking from a plane at
the Atlanta airport, he seemed to fit the drug courier profile in a number of
respects.' 8 4 Based on this observation, the agent investigated further and,
after learning that McCranie was flying on a one-way ticket from a "drug
source" city in Florida, accosted McCranie and requested an interview.' 8 5
During the interview, the agent accused McCranie of carrying drugs and
requested permission to search McCranie's luggage.18 6 McCranie became
nervous and refused the requested permission, whereupon the agent termi-
nated the interview and informed McCranie that other agents would meet
him at his destination.'
87
The agent then notified a fellow DEA agent in Tulsa (McCranie's desti-
nation) of his suspicions about McCranie, also informing the other agent
that investigation following the interview had revealed that McCranie had a
prior criminal record which included marijuana convictions.188 Upon arri-
val and after retrieving his luggage, McCranie consented to an interview
with a DEA agent who was accompanied by a Tulsa policeman. 8 9 McCra-
nie was then given his Miranda advisements. 190 After he refused to permit a
search of his luggage, a sniffing dog (and three more policemen) were sum-
moned.' 9 ' The dog was not trained in narcotics sniffing, but nonetheless
selected McCranie's suitcase. 192 McCranie was then permitted to leave, but
was later arrested and convicted when a search pursuant to warrant revealed
that his suitcase contained cocaine.'
9 3
On appeal, McCranie argued that he was "seized" for fourth amend-
ment purposes in the Tulsa Airport, and that the seizure was not supported
by a reasonable, articulable suspicion, but only by the DEA agents'
hunches. 194 He conceded that the dog's signals provided reasonable suspi-
181. Id at 913.
182. See id
183. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
184. The "suspicious" characteristics exhibited by McCranie included: 1) flying on a one-
way ticket: 2) a flight emanating from a major drug source city, Ft. Myers, Florida; and
3) McCranie's apparent nervousness. United States v. McCranie, 703 F.2d i213, 1215 (10th









193. Id at 1216. McCranie was convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982).
194. 703 F.2d at 1216.
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cion or probable cause, but argued that because these signals came after he
and his suitcase had been illegally seized, the evidence obtained as a result of
that seizure should have been suppressed.'
95
In an opinion by Judge Doyle, the Tenth Circuit, with Judge McKay
dissenting, held that McCranie presented no fourth amendment violation
because he was not seized in either Atlanta or Tulsa. 1 96 Because the police
did not make an overt display of force, did not seize McCranie's wallet,
move him from a public area, or detain him for a lengthy period, the court
characterized the encounters as mere police-citizen contacts to which the
fourth amendment does not apply. 197 The majority held that the circum-
stances of the detentions would not have indicated to a reasonable person
that he or she was in custody and under official compulsion to answer ques-
tions.198 Thus, any evidence which was discovered was not discovered pur-
suant to an illegal search.
The court held alternatively that even if the Tulsa encounter was a
seizure, the participating agent had the reasonable suspicion necessary to
make a Terry stop. 199 The reasonable suspicion was provided by the match
between McCranie's conduct and some of the drug courier profile character-
istics, in conjunction with the discovery of McCranie's criminal record.
20 0
The court stated that McCranie's behavior would not, by itself, have sup-
ported seizure, but that the drug courier profile characteristics combined
with his criminal record did give rise to reasonable suspicion.
20
Judge McKay filed a blistering dissent. For Judge McKay, the offen-
sive note in the seizure and search was the use of the drug courier profile. He
characterized the use of the profile as a "prime example of organized en-
forcement efforts that are rapidly eroding our protection against unwar-
ranted, arbitrary intrusions of public officials."'202 Judge McKay stressed
that the courts know little or nothing about the characteristics making up
the profile, the standards that guide its application, or the probability that
the profile incorporates a racial bias not amenable to judicial review.
20 3
According to the dissent, McCranie's alleged drug courier characteris-
tics could not have provided reasonable suspicion, much less probable cause,
because these characteristics are indistinguishable from the traits exhibited
by many perfectly innocent travelers. 20 4 Judge McKay also noted that even
federal judges might become nervous when accosted by DEA agents. 20 5 Fur-
ther, the defendant's criminal record should not have been permitted to add
to the quality of the agent's suspicions "unless people who have previously
195. Id
196. Id at 1218.
197. Id. at 1217-18.
198. Id
199. Id. at 1218.
200. Id
201. Id.
202. Id at 1218-19 (McKay, J., dissenting).
203. Id at 1218-19 (citing United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1353 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1979)
(Oakes, J., dissenting)).




been arrested are excepted from Fourth Amendment protection. '" 20 6 Judge
McKay found that McCranie had been "seized" as he was about to leave the
Tulsa Airport, because a reasonable person in his position would have be-
lieved that he was not free to leave.20 7 Thus, because the seizure was not
supported by reasonable suspicion, the evidence discovered by the sniffing
dog was tainted and therefore subject to suppression.
208
D. lmphcations of McCranie
In McCran'e, the court seemed to follow the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Reid v. Georgta2 0 9 by rejecting a person's similarity to the drug courier
profile as an independently sufficient basis for a Terry stop.2 10 This appears
to be a retreat from MacDonald, where the court found that similarity to the
drug courier profile, in light of the agent's experience in observing drug ped-
dlers, was sufficient to provide the reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry
stop.2 11 It should be noted, however, that even if McCranie is a retreat from
MacDonald the "something more" than the drug profile now required for a
reasonable suspicion is not very much at all; in McCranie, the defendant's
criminal record was sufficient.
VII. LINAM v. GRIFFIN: THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE AND
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ADJUDICATIONS
Pursuant to New Mexico's original habitual criminal statute,21 2 when a
defendant with prior felony convictions was again convicted of a felony, the
district attorney could file a supplemental information seeking an enhanced
sentence based on the number of felony convictions.2 1 3 The court was then
required to hold a jury hearing on the issue of whether the defendant had in
fact been convicted of the alleged prior felonies. 2 14 If the jury found that the
defendant did in fact commit the prior felonies as alleged, the judge was
required to impose an enhanced sentence for the underlying felony
conviction.
21 5
Linam, a thrice convicted felon, was convicted of two counts of forgery
and, after an habitual offender hearing, was given a life sentence pursuant to
the enhanced punishment provisions of New Mexico's habitual criminal stat-
ute. 2 16 On appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court, Linam argued that
206. Id.
207. Id at 1220. Judge McKay noted that a person who has received Mranda warnings and
who is the object of concern of four armed policemen would not reasonably feel free to leave.
Id
208. Id
209. 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
210. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
212. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-5 (1978) (repealed 1977). A similar statute, which became
effective in 1979, is codified in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-17 (Supp. 1981).
213. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-7 (1978) (repealed 1977). A similar statute, which became
effective in 1979, is codified in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-20 (Supp. 1981).
214. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-7 (1978) (repealed 1977).
215. Id.
216. Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369, 370-71 (10th Cir. 1982).
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the habitual offender statute should be construed to require proof that each
prior felony was committed after conviction for the immediately preceding
felony. 2 17 The prosecution had not presented evidence on the dates of
Linam's prior felony convictions because earlier constructions and the plain
language of the statute did not so require. 2 8 The New Mexico Supreme
Court adopted Linam's argument and construed the enhanced sentencing
statute to require proof of the sequence of prior felonies.2 19 Linam's case was
remanded to the trial court for a second hearing during which the prosecu-
tion would have an opportunity to supply the newly-required evidence of the
dates of the prior felonies. 220 On remand, Linam was given a life
sentence.
22 1
Following exhaustion of state post-conviction relief procedures, Linam
filed a habeas petition with the federal district court, arguing that the re-
hearing violated his fourteenth amendment right not to be subjected to
double jeopardy. 222 Linam argued that because the New Mexico Supreme
Court had stated that there was "no substantial evidence" to support the
original enhanced sentence,2 23 the double jeopardy clause barred his re-
trial. 224 Linam relied on the United States Supreme Court decision in Burks
v. United States,225 which held that where a conviction is reversed by an ap-
pellate court on the ground of insufficient evidence, the defendant may not
be retried. 226 The district court rejected Linam's habeas petition, and he
appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit, in Linam v. Grffin ,227 rejected the proffered analogy
to Burks and affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Linam's habeas peti-
tion. 228 The court emphasized that prior to Linam's state court challenge to
the evidentiary requirements of New Mexico's enhanced sentencing statute,
New Mexico courts had not required proof of the date of conviction for prior
felonies.2 29 Linam's conviction was not reversed because the prosecution put
on all the evidence it had and came up short, or because there was negligent
failure to carry the burden of proof 2 30 In Judge Doyle's view, the reversal of
Linam's conviction was caused by something more akin to trial error than a
true inadequacy of evidence.2 3' Because reversal for trial error does not
subject a person to the risk of twice being at the mercy of the state's presenta-
217. State v. Linam, 93 N.M. 307, 307, 600 P.2d 253, 253, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 846 (1979).
218. Id at 310, 600 P.2d at 256.
219. Id at 309, 600 P.2d at 255.
220. Id. at 310, 600 P.2d at 256.
221. Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1982).
222. Id at 371. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (recognizing that fifth amend-
ment is applicable to states via due process clause of fourteenth amendment).
223. State v. Linam, 93 N.M. 307, 310, 600 P.2d 253, 256, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 846 (1979).
224. 685 F.2d at 373.
225. 437 U.S. I (1978).
226. Id at 18. The defendant may not be retried because reversal for insufficient evidence is
an implicit aquittal on the charge. See id. at 16-18.
227. 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1982).
228. Id at 372.
229. Id at 373.
230. Id at 373-74.
231. Id. at 373.
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tion of its full case, double jeopardy did not bar Linam's retrial.
2 32
The Tenth Circuit also held, as an alternative basis for its decision, that
double jeopardy protections were inapplicable during Linam's rehearing be-
cause New Mexico's enhanced sentencing proceeding was merely part of the
sentencing phase of trial, and not an adjudication of guilt or innocence to
which double jeopardy protections traditionally apply.2 33 Judge Ander-
son 2 3 4 refrained from joining this portion of the opinion.
235
In reaching its alternative holding, the Tenth Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in DiFrancesco v. United Sates,236 which the Tenth
Circuit read as holding that a criminal sentence, once pronounced, is not to
be accorded finality and conclusiveness similar to that which attaches to a
jury's verdict of acquittal. 237 The court emphasized that New Mexico's en-
hanced sentencing proceeding did not involve conviction for a distinct crime
and should not be equated with a judgment on the issue of guilt or inno-
cence; rather, the proceeding was little more than a procedural formality
required to establish that the defendant had committed prior felonies as
shown by the public records. 238 Given its purely formal, almost perfunctory
quality, New Mexico's habitual criminal proceeding was not, in the court's




Judge Anderson, writing separately, concurred in the majority's denial
of habeas on the basis of the trial error analysis, but sharply disagreed with
the majority's application of DiFrancesco. In Judge Anderson's view, Bulling-
Ion v. Mssour, 240 decided by the Supreme Court almost a half year after
DiFrancesco, compelled the conclusion that the double jeopardy clause was
implicated by New Mexico's habitual criminal proceeding.
241
Bullington was convicted of capital murder. 24 2 Under Missouri's then
existing statutory scheme, following a decision on guilt or innocence in a
capital case a jury was required to make the sentencing determination and
select between the death penalty and life imprisonment. 24 3 In this separate
sentencing proceeding, which involved a virtual full scale trial on the exist-
ence of aggravating factors justifying capital punishment, 244 the jury failed
to find the statutory aggravating circumstances and sentenced Bullington to
life imprisonment. 245 Subsequently, Bullington was granted a new trial due
232. Id at 374 (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978)).
233. 685 F.2d at 376.
234. Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Utah, sitting by designation.
235. 685 F.2d at 376 (Anderson, J., concurring).
236. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
237. 685 F.2d at 374.
238. See id. at 373, 376.
239. Id at 376.
240. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
241. 685 F.2d at 376 (Anderson, J., concurring).
242. 451 U.S. at 435.
243. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.006 (1978) (repealed 1983).
244. 451 U.S. at 438.
245 Id at 436
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to certain sixth amendment violations.2 46 The Supreme Court held that the
double jeopardy clause prohibited the prosecution from seeking the death
penalty upon retrial. 247 Essentially, the original jury's decision to sentence
Bullington to life imprisonment after an effective trial on whether Bulling-
ton's behavior required imposition of the death penalty constituted a finding
that Bullington was innocent of engaging in conduct punishable by
death.
248
Judge Anderson opined that New Mexico's enhanced sentencing pro-
ceeding was sufficiently similar to the sentencing procedure analyzed in Bull-
ington to implicate the double jeopardy clause. 249  Judge Anderson
emphasized that the sentencing proceeding was conducted like a trial, with
the defendant entitled to be present at the proceedings, to have counsel, and
to have the issues tried to a jury.250 Further, the prosecution was required to
prove essential issues of fact, and was most probably required to meet a bur-
den of proof.2 5 1 The trial nature of the proceeding triggered Linam's double
jeopardy protections;2 52 the majority's failure to recognize this crucial thrust
of Bulhngton necessitated Judge Anderson's separate opinion.
VIII. OTHER TENTH CIRCUIT DOUBLE JEOPARDY DEVELOPMENTS
In Abney v. United States,253 the Supreme Court held that a trial court's
pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss on grounds of double jeopardy
was a "final decision" and thus immediately appealable. 254 Typically, filing
an Abne appeal will result in a stay of trial court proceedings.2 55 In United
States v. Hines,256 the Tenth Circuit recognized that where a "district court
has considered a double jeopardy claim after a hearing and, for substantial
reasons given, finds the claim to be frivolous, the district court should not be
divested of jurisdiction by an Abney appeal." 2 57 In that circumstance, both
the district court and court of appeals will have jurisdiction to proceed.
2 5
1
In United States v. Puckett, 259 the Tenth Circuit declared that, although
the "same evidence" test is still the test used by the court in determining
whether two statutes proscribe the same offense for double jeopardy pur-
poses, the "totality of the circumstances" test might be adopted in the appro-
246. Id
247. Id at 446.
248. The Court stated: "Because the sentencing proceeding at petitioner's ... trial was like
the trial on the question of guilt or innocence, the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause to one aquitted by a jury is also available to him, with respect to the death penalty, at
his retrial." Id (emphasis supplied, footnote omitted).
249. 685 F.2d at 377 (Anderson, J., concurring).
250. Id
251. Id. at 378-79.
252. Id at 379. Accord Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1982).
253. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
254. Id at 662.
255. See United States v. Hines, 689 F.2d 934, 936 (10th Cir. 1982).
256. 689 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1982).
257. Id. at 937.
258. See id. at 938.
259. 692 F.2d 663 (10th Cir. 1982). cert. denied. 103 S. Ct. 579 (1983).
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priate case. 2 6 0 Under the "same evidence" or "Blockburger" 26 ' test, two
offenses are identical for double jeopardy purposes only if the facts alleged in
one would sustain a conviction if offered in support of the other.
2 62 The
court noted that the same evidence test has been sharply criticized in recent
years as an inadequate measurement of double jeopardy when applied to
multiple prosecution for conspiracy charges.2 6 3 The Sixth and Eighth Cir-
cuits have rejected the same evidence test in favor of a totality of the circum-
stances approach in multiple conspiracy prosecution.
2 64  Under this
approach, double jeopardy protections are implicated unless the prosecution
can demonstrate that the criminal agreements in separate conspiracy prose-
cutions are "indeed separate and distinct."
265
IX. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
During the period covered by this survey, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals heard three significant cases involving the sixth amendment 266 right
to effective assistance of counsel. The three, United States v. Golub (Golub
I1),267 Griffin v. Winans ,268 and United States v. Verdin ,269 apply and expand
the principles set forth in United States v. Golub 2 7 0 (Golub I), an earlier Tenth
Circuit consideration of a defendant's sixth amendment claims.
A. United States v. Golub (Golub II)
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals heard Golub I in 1980. In Golub I,
Robert Golub appealed his mail fraud convictions, 27 1 claiming he was de-
nied adequate assistance of counsel at trial because his trial attorney, Shel-
don Emeson, was not skilled in criminal law, and further had not had
adequate time to prepare. 2 72 Golub had originally retained another attor-
ney; two weeks before trial, however, the attorney was permitted to with-
draw because Golub was uncooperative, had not paid his fees, and, most
importantly, because Golub had misled the attorney.27 3 Golub then re-
tained Emeson, his uncle by marriage. 27 4 Emeson attempted to obtain a
260. Id. at 668.
261. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 229 (1932).
262. 692 F.2d at 667.
263. Id at 668.
264. See United States v. Jabarra, 644 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Tercero,
580 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1978).
265. United States v. Tercero, 580 F.2d 312, 317 (5th Cir. 1978).
266. U.S. CONST., amend. VI.
267. 694 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1982).
268. 684 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1982).
269. No. 81-2346, slip op. (10th Cir. Mar. 21, 1983).
270. 638 F.2d 185 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 694 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1982). Other recent Tenth
Circuit opinions concerned with the effective assistance of counsel are United States v. King,
664 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1981) and United States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982),cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 1182 (1983).
271. Golub was found guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 2314 (1982). 638 F.2d at 186.
272. Golub 1, 638 F.2d at 188.
273. d. Golub did not oppose the motion to withdraw. United States v. Golub, 694 F.2d
207, 208 (10th Cir. 1982) (Golub I).
274. Golub 1. 638 F.2d at 188.
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continuance by telephone, which the trial judge denied27 5 in accordance
with statements made at the time Golub's first lawyer was permitted to with-
draw.276 The case then proceeded to trial as scheduled and, as noted, Golub
was convicted.
Golub I originally reversed Golub's convictions and ordered a new
trial. 27 7 The Tenth Circuit found that Emeson performed adequately at
trial, but had not been given adequate time to prepare for trial in light of the
case's complexity, the geographical dispersion of witnesses, and his unfamili-
arity with criminal law.278 The government then filed a motion for rehear-
ing, tendering an affidavit from the trial court which stated that Golub had
received above average assistance of counsel.2 79 The Tenth Circuit granted
the motion, and on rehearing en banc stayed Golub I's order for a new trial,
instead ordering the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on whether
Emeson's forensic performance was inadequate and whether Emeson's trial
preparation time was inadequate. 280 The evidentiary hearing was held over
a period of nine months to ensure that Golub would have an ample opportu-
nity to present evidence of inadequate assistance.28' After hearing Golub's
evidence, including expert witnesses, the trial judge found that Emeson's fo-
rensic performance was extremely capable, 28 2 and that no prejudice resulted
from the short trial preparation time.2 8 3 The review of the evidentiary hear-
ing and the trial court's findings formed the basis for the second UnltedStates
v. Golub284 (Golub IF).
Applying the standards enunciated in the earlier Tenth Circuit decision
Dyer v. Crisp ,285 -olub II, over Judge Doyle's dissent, found Emeson's forensic
performance constitutionally adequate. Under Dyer, the court does not look
for a flawless defense, but rather one which reflects the skill of a reasonably
competent defense attorney.286 Because the record at the evidentiary hear-
ing indicated that Emeson's performance satisfied that standard, no constitu-
tional right was violated by the manner in which Golub's counsel conducted
the defense.
28 7
The Tenth Circuit then had to consider whether the trial court had
violated Golub's sixth amendment rights by denying Emeson adequate time
to prepare for trial. The factors used by the Tenth Circuit to determine
275. Id. at 186.
276. At the withdrawal hearing, the trial judge told Golub that the trial would proceed as
scheduled, with or without counsel. Id
277. Id at 190.
278. Id at 189.
279. Golub II, 694 F.2d at 209.
280. Id at 210.
281. Id. at 210-11.
282. Id. at 211.
283. Id. at 212.
284. 694 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1982).
285. 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980).
286. 613 F.2d at 278.
287. Golub II, 694 F.2d at 214. The court noted that the adequacy of trial counsel's repre-
sentation had to be determined, at least in part, by reference to the defendant's behavior.




whether given preparation time was constitutionally sufficient were: 1) the
time allowed to investigate and prepare; 2) counsel's experience; 3) the sever-
ity of the offenses charged; 4) the complexity of the defense; and 5) counsel's
accessibility to witnesses.288 The majority found that these factors com-
ported with a Supreme Court admonition that sixth amendment protections
are not violated unless an asserted interference with the right to counsel
either prejudices, or threatens to prejudice, the effectiveness of counsel's rep-
resentation.289 Thus, unless the facts of the particular case demonstrate that
the defendant was actually prejudiced by the time allowed for preparation,
or that there was a substantial threat of prejudice, the trial court has not
deprived the defendant's sixth amendment rights.29° Because Golub was
unable to show, through the evidentiary hearing or otherwise, how he had
been prejudiced by the short trial preparation period, the Tenth Circuit,
over Judge Doyle's dissent, reversed and vacated Golub 1.291
Judge Doyle dissented because he found that the trial court's actions
had denied Golub effective assistance of counsel. The dissent emphasized
that sophisticated mail fraud cases are inherently complex and difficult for
both prosecution and defense. 29 2 This complexity, which by itself might
have mandated a longer preparation period, was exacerbated by Emeson's
unfamiliarity with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.29 3 Further, the
trial court had failed to advise Golub of his right to appointed counsel,
294
thus virtually forcing him to retain counsel inexperienced in a federal court
defense of a serious and difficult federal charge.295 Finally, Judge Doyle
stressed that the majority's reliance on the absence of prejudice wrongly fo-
cused the constitutional inquiry. In United States V. Morrtson ,296 which the
majority relied on in articulating its absence of prejudice standard,29 7 the
Court addressed whether police interference with the relationship between a
defendant and her counsel justified dismissal of an indictment. 298  The
Court did not decide whether proof of prejudice from prosecutorial interfer-
288. 694 F.2d at 214. These factors were originally announced in Golub I See 638 F.2d at
189 (citing Wolfs v. Britton, 509 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1975)).
289. 694 F.2d at 214, (quoting United States v. King, 664 F.2d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 1981))
(quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981)). Accord United States v. Cronic,
675 F.2d 1126, 1128 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1182 (1983).
290. Golub (I, 694 F.2d at 215.
291. Id at 216.
292. Id at 220-21 (Doyle, J., dissenting)-
293. See id at 218 (Emeson's failure to file written motion for continuance indicative of lack
of familiarity with Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and therefore indicative of Emeson's
lack of preparation).
294. Id. at 219. FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(a) provides: "Every defendant who is unable to obtain
counsel shall be entitled to have counsel assigned to represent him at every stage of the proceed-
ings from his initial appearance before the federal magistrate or the court through appeal, un-
less he waives such appointment." See also 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982).
295. See 694 F.2d at 218-20 (Doyle, J., dissenting). Judge Doyle observed that Emeson was
unable to obtain any of his colleagues to represent Golub, given the complex case and the short
preparation period, id at 218 and that Emerson's request for a continuance reflected his own
belief that the preparation period was inadequate. See id
296. 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
297. See supra notes 288-89 and accompanying text.
298. 449 U.S. at 363-64.
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ence was necessary to estabhsh a sixth amendment violation.299 Judge Doyle
flatly rejected the majority's position:
[T]he presence or absence of prejudice should not be and cannot be
the test of the violation of the Constitution. In an inadequacy of
counsel case to require proof that a different result would have oc-
curred had able counsel been present is not a true test of the uncon-
stitutionality of the action.
3 ° °
Accordingly, the dissent would have remanded the case for a new trial so
that Golub could obtain effective counsel. 30 1
B. Griffin v. Winans
The question presented to the Tenth Circuit in Griffin v. Win'ans3° 2 was
whether the defendant's representation by a relatively inexperienced alco-
holic attorney violated the sixth amendment right to effective counsel,
thereby justifying the federal district court's grant of habeas relief.
30 3
Habeas relief was necessary because New Mexico's trial and appellate courts
had rejected Griffin's sixth amendment claims because his attorney's con-
duct did not cause the trial to become a "sham and mockery" of justice.
30 4
In affirming the grant of habeas relief, the Tenth Circuit observed that
the trial court had properly conducted an evidentiary hearing, and had
properly rejected New Mexico's application of the sham and mockery stan-
dard. The court recognized that although federal courts are bound by state
court findings of fact absent a statutory exception, 30 5 in this case the state
courts had made no findings of fact.306 Thus, the federal district court's
evidentiary hearing was proper. Similarly, the federal district court had
properly rejected use of the sham and mockery standard, recognizing that
the Tenth Circuit has adopted the more stringent "reasonably competent
counsel" standard for assessing an asserted violation of a defendant's sixth
amendment right.
30 7
The district court found that Griffin's representation was constitution-
ally inadequate because his lawyer was unprepared, was forensically ineffec-
tive, and was chronically intoxicated. 30 8  Reviewing the district court's
299. Id. at 364.
300. 694 F.2d at 221 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
301. Id
302. 684 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1982).
303. Id at 687.
304. Id at 688 & n.2 (quoting unpublished New Mexico trial, appellate court opinions).
305. Id at 688 (citing Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982)). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(1982).
306. See 684 F.2d at 688.
307. Id at 689. The "reasonably competent counsel" standard was adopted in Dyer v.
Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. demed, 445 U.S. 945 (1980). New Mexico had
alleged that its courts had in fact applied the reasonable counsel standard, and that the "sham
and mockery" language actually used was "unfortunate semantics." 648 F.2d at 689. The
Tenth Circuit agreed that the district court had properly rejected this argument, pointing to the
testimony of the trial judge concerning the standard he had applied and the explicit language of
the state appellate opinion. See id. New Mexico has since adopted the reasonably competent
counsel standard. State v. Orona, 97 N.M. 232, 638 P.2d 1077 (1982).
308. 684 F.2d at 689 n.4.
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factual conclusions under the clearly erroneous standard,3 0 9 the Tenth Cir-
cuit found the district court's findings supported by substantial evidence and
therefore acceptable.3 10 In light of those findings, the Tenth Circuit agreed
that the district court had properly found that the defendant's sixth amend-
ment rights were violated, and had properly granted the requested habeas
relief.
3 t1
C. United States v. Verdin
Winans demonstrates that having inadequate, inexperienced, and ill-
prepared counsel violates a defendant's sixth amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel. In UniedStates o. Verdin, 312 the Tenth Circuit articu-
lated a distinction between ineffective counsel and counsel using unsuccess-
ful trial strategy. In Verdin, counsel decided not to impeach an identifying
witness and not to call alibi witnesses because, according to counsel, this
testimony would have been cumulative and inconclusive. 31 3 The Tenth Cir-
cuit found that the decision to refrain from calling these witnesses was a
mere strategic decision, which could not support a claim of constitutionally
ineffective counsel.
314
X. EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES AS PREREQUISITE TO FEDERAL
HABEAS RELIEF
Under the recent United States Supreme Court ruling Rose v. Lundy,
3t 5
habeas corpus petitioners must exhaust all of their claims at the state level
before a federal district court can hear a petition for habeas corpus relief.
31 6
Prior to Lundy, the Tenth Circuit had held that where a petition presented
both exhausted and unexhausted (or mixed) claims, the exhausted claims
could be considered, but the unexhausted claims had to be dismissed.
31 7
This rule was changed inJones v. Hess
3
18 to conform to Lundy's standards.
3 9
Jones was convicted by an Oklahoma jury in August, 1971 on two
counts of murder and one count of shooting with intent to kill. 320 The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions in May,
1973.321 Jones then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Pittsburg
County District Court in March, 1976.322 The district court denied the ap-
309. Id. at 690.
310. Id.
311. Id
312. No. 81-2346 (10th Cir. Mar. 21, 1983).
313. Id at 3.
314. Id
315. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
316. Id. at 510.
317. E.g., Smith v. Gaffney, 462 F.2d 663, 665 (10th Cir. 1972); Whiteley v. Meacham, 416
F.2d 36, 39 (10th Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560
(197 I); Watson v. Patterson, 358 F.2d 297, 298 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. dented, 385 U.S. 876 (1966).
318. 681 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1982).
319. See id. at 695.
320. Id at 685.
321. Jones v. State, 509 P.2d 924, 925-27 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
322. 681 F.2d at 689.
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plication in September, 1977 after an evidentiary hearing. 323 The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals finally affirmed the district court's denial of post-
conviction relief on April 10, 1979.324 In May, 1979, Jones filed a habeas
corpus petition with the federal district court, which denied the petition in
1980 with respect to all claims except one relating to judicial bias and mis-
conduct. 325 This claim was dismissed for failure to exhaust state court reme-
dies. 326 Jones then appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
32 7
Judge Holloway, writing for a unanimous court, observed that petitioner's
claim of prejudicial ex parte communication between the trial judge and
prosecution "if accepted, would present a very serious and disturbing chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of Jones's convictions, grounded on the consti-
tutional right to a fair trial and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 32 8 The district court, however, had not reached the merits of
the claim, holding that because the claim was not exhausted in the state
courts it could not be considered. 32 9 The initial consideration on appeal was
the propriety of that ruling.
330
Jones asserted two bases for error in the district court's ruling. First, he
argued that a general claim of bias had been presented to the state courts,
and the additional evidence presented to the district court was merely addi-
tional evidence of bias. 331 Remanding his claim, Jones argued, would re-
quire him to file repetitious applications, in violation of Wiwording v.
Swenson.
33 2 Alternately, Jones argued, because he had been incarcerated
since 1971, the amount of time already spent in litigation and the seriousness
of the constitutional violation made his case sufficiently exceptional to per-
mit a relaxation of the exhaustion requirement.
3 33
Judge Holloway quickly disposed of Jones' second argument by refer-
ence to the Supreme Court case of Duckworth v. Serrano .334 Duckworth rejected
the argument that hardship to a petitioner caused by delay, in conjunction
with a strong showing of constitutional deprivation, could justify an excep-
tion to the exhaustion requirement. 335 The Court held that the only excep-
tion to exhaustion occurred when there was no opportunity to obtain redress
in state court, or when the deficiencies in available state court procedures
rendered resort to state court futile. 336  The Tenth Circuit found
Oklahoma's post-conviction proceedings adequate, 337 so that Jones' case did
323. Id
324. Id at 690.
325. Id at 690-91.
326. Id at 691, 693.
327. Id at 691.
328. Id at 692.
329. Id. at 693.
330. Id
331. Id.
332. 404 U.S. 249 (1971). See 681 F.2d at 693.
333. 681 F.2d at 693.
334. 454 U.S. 1 (1981).
335. I at 4.
336. Id. at 3.
337. Ste 681 F.2d at 694 n 7
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not fall within the exceptions to exhaustion permitted by Duckworih.338
The Tenth Circuit also rejected Jones' argument that he had in fact
exhausted his judicial bias claim. The court observed that when newly dis-
covered evidence, such as that presented by Jones, placed a claim in a "sig-
nificantly different posture," the claim must be heard by the state courts
prior to a federal habeas petition.339 Because Jones' evidence of judicial im-
propriety was new, and significant, 340 the bias claim was placed in a new,
and therefore unexhausted, posture.
3 4 1
After determining that Jones' petition contained mixed claims, the
court analyzed Lundy 's applicability to Jones' petition. The court noted that
in the absence of manifest injustice, it was required to apply the law in effect
at the time of decision. 342  Despite Jones' lengthy incarceration, and the
further delay resulting from remand, the court felt compelled to apply
Lundy's total exhaustion rule.34 3 Hence, following remand, Jones would
have a choice of exhausting his bias claim, or amending his petition to ex-
clude, and possibly forfeit, the claim.
344
XI. EFFECT OF STATE WAIVER OF HABEAS EXHAUSTION
REQUIREMENTS
Naranjo v. Ricketts 34 5 represents the Tenth Circuit's entry into the circuit
court debate over whether a federal court should assume jurisdiction over a
habeas claim when the state attempts to waive the exhaustion require-
ment. 34 6 Naranjo held that the general rule in the Tenth Circuit will be to
require exhaustion regardless of the state's attempted waiver.
34 7
The appellants in Naranjo had been convicted in Colorado of first degree
kidnapping and first degree sexual assault. 3 48 These convictions were modi-
fied by the Colorado Supreme Court. 3 4 9 The Naranjos then brought a
habeas claim to the district court, arguing that the Colorado Supreme
Court's modification of their convictions was unconstitutional. 350 After the
338. Id at 694.
339. Id.
340. Id Copies of the ex parte communications are reproduced id at 696-99.
341. Id
342. Id at 695 n.9.
343. Id at 695.
344. Id. at 695 (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-21 (1982)). A case which followed
soon afterjones is Reed v. Brown, No. 82-1354 (10th Cir. Aug. 3, 1982). The petitioner, Reed,
filed a mixed petition for habeas corpus relief presenting exhausted and unexhausted claims.
Citing Lundy, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case giving Reed the same option as Jones in the
earlier case: either amend the petition by deleting the unexhausted claims, thereby risking no
further consideration of the unexhausted claims, or first exhaust the remaining unexhausted
claims. Id at 2-3 (citingjones, 681 F.2d at 693).
345. 696 F.2d 83 (10th Cir. 1982).
346. Compare Batten v. Scurr, 649 F.2d 564, 568-69 (8th Cir. 1981); Jenkins v. Fitzberger,
440 F.2d 1188, 1189 (4th Cir. 1971) (deciding in favor of assuming jurisdiction) w1*h Sweet v.
Culp, 640 F.2d 233, 237 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981); Gayle v. LeFerre, 613 F.2d 21, 22 n.I (2d Cir. 1980)
(requiring strict compliance with exhaustion doctrine).
347. 696 F.2d at 87.
348. Id. at 84.
349. Id
350. Id at 85.
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petitions were dismissed with prejudice by the district court for failure to
exhaust state remedies, the Tenth Circuit, on appeal, remanded the cases to
determine whether the Naranjos' claims had been properly exhausted.
3 5 1
The state attorney general then applied for a rehearing, claiming that
because the state had waived the exhaustion requirement, the circuit court
could dismiss the case on the merits. 35 2 The Tenth Circuit declined to do so,
stating that although exhaustion was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to fed-
eral jurisdiction over a habeas petition 35 3 protection of the state court's role
in the enforcement of federal law required strict enforcement of the exhaus-
tion requirement. 354 In reaching its conclusion, the Tenth Circuit weighed
expediency and the efficient use ofjudicial resources against the need to pro-
tect and promote the state's role in preserving constitutional protections,
finding the latter to be the more important consideration. 355
XII. JUDICIAL REFERENCE TO CO-CONSPIRATORS AT VOIR DIRE
The Tenth Circuit found reversible error in United States v. Baez 35 6 when
the trial judge's voir dire included comments about previous guilty pleas of
alleged co-conspirators and the possibility that one of those co-conspirators
might offer testimony exculpating the defendant. 35 7 The exculpatory testi-
mony, which was to have come from the defendant's son, never material-
ized.358 The other alleged co-conspirator testified and his guilty plea was
elicited; 359 the trial court, however, failed to give the required instruction
limiting the use of such testimony. 360 The Tenth Circuit found these actions
constituted plain error sufficiently prejudicial to overturn the defendant's
conviction.
36'
Judge Seymour found the logic of two Fifth Circuit cases directly on
point to be controlling. 362 In reversing a conviction where the trial judge
had told prospective jurors that the defendant's co-indictees had pled guilty,
the Fifth Circuit stated:
There is no need to advise the jury or its prospective members that
someone not in court, not on trial, and not to be tried, has pleaded
guilty. The prejudice to the remaining parties who are charged
with complicity in the acts of the self-confessed guilty participant is
351. Id
352. Id
353. Id at 86.
354. Id at 86 (listing cases).
355. Id. at 87.
356. 703 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1983).
357. See id. at 454-55.
358. The defendant's son did not testify. Id at 455.
359. Id
360. Id A co-defendant's guilty plea does not constitute substantive evidence, 1. (citing
United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1981)), and must be accompanied by a
limiting instruction so stating. 703 F.2d at 455 (citing United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000,
1006-07 (9th Cir. 1981)).
361. 703 F.2d at 455-56. The defendant had been convicted of distributing, and conspiring
to distribute phencyclidine (PCP) in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1982). 703 F.2d
at 454.
362. 703 F.2d at 455 (citing United States v. Vaughn, 546 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1977); United





Judge Seymour found the error in Baez to be even greater than that in
the Fifth Circuit cases, because once the defendant's son failed to testify the
jury might have readily concluded that the failure to testify was because the
son felt he could not "honestly testify in his father's favor."' 364 Given the
prejudice resulting from the trial judge's conduct, reversal was required. 365
David Dansky
Davidj apha
363. United States v. Hansen, 544 F.2d 778, 780 (5th Cir. 1977), quoted in Baez, 703 F.2d at
455.
364. 703 F.2d at 455.
365. Id
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